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3Executive summary 
Despite	the	enormous	benefits	refugees	can	bring	to	
European economies and societies, their integration 
remains a long and arduous process that requires 
improvement. Refugee integration has become even more 
challenging with the increased number of arrivals in the 
past few years. It has, in certain countries, put national 
services dealing with the reception and integration of 
refugees under strain and contributed to the rise of anti-
migration forces in European societies. While integration 
policies do not fall under the core competences of the 
European Union (EU), the importance of the issue and 
its possible collateral effects on EU migration policies, 
the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), and, 
in general, the future of Europe, leaves the EU with no 
choice but to act. 
The EU should start with ensuring and facilitating the 
access to the labour markets in the member states, which 
is a crucial element of refugee integration. As well as 
being a source of income, jobs serve as a vehicle for social 
inclusion.	More	specifically,	the	EU	needs	to	prioritise	
the dialogue with employers, who play a pivotal role in 
bridging the gap between the initial reception of refugees 
and their sustainable inclusion into the host society. 
Several EU initiatives have already sought to promote 
the integration and fair treatment of refugees. They 
consist	of	financial	support,	legislation,	and	policy	actions	
to, for example, promote mutual learning and sharing 
of best practices. However, despite a growing number 
of EU actions, there has been a collective failure to 
prioritise integration and to adapt the implementation 
of integration policies. National politics and outdated 
practices still shape how integration is managed and 
assessed, and coordination between and within countries 
is lacking. 
According to the European employers who participated 
in the EPC project and responded to a questionnaire, the 
barriers to hiring refugees remain high. Three obstacles 
were	identified	as	being	particularly	problematic:	the	
complex	process	of	qualification	recognition	(i),	legal	
restrictions on working during the asylum-seeking 
process,	together	with	a	lack	of	job-specific	training	
opportunities (ii), and inadequate and uncoordinated 
support from local, regional and national public 
authorities (iii). 
The current political mood in national capitals is clearly 
not conducive to expanding EU competencies in the 
area of integration policies, and there is a high risk that 
the integration of refugees remains the weak link in 
the upcoming reform of EU migration policies. Despite 
such constraints and limited room for action, the EU 
has, however, the possibility to maximise its impact 
on refugee integration on the ground, by acting as the 
interface between national authorities and employers. It 
should create an enabling environment that allows for the 
obstacles faced by employers to be (better) addressed at 
the local level. If the EU succeeds in doing this, it will also 
be able to position itself strategically to offer a counter-
narrative to anti-migration forces. 
Three key principles need to lie at the core of an effective 
EU strategy on refugee integration. They consist of 
addressing fragmentation (i); offering policy guidance to 
member states to move towards sustainable integration 
policies	(ii);	and	leveraging	financial	support	(iii).	With	
the current politico-institutional cycle coming to an end, 
it is the right time for the EU to ensure that the ongoing 
negotiations	on	the	financial	and	policy	framework	
that will shape the next cycle take into account the 
recommendations presented in this discussion paper. 
Introduction
The number of arrivals and asylum applications in the 
European	Union	(EU)	have	decreased	significantly	since	
peaking in 2015, falling by 83 and 45 percentage points 
respectively.1 However, this does not mean that the 
issue deserves any less attention. In total, over three 
million migrants have applied for asylum since 2015.2 
Enabling them to contribute to Europe’s economy and 
fully integrate into European societies still requires a 
significant	amount	of	work.	
Bringing the different levels of governance together 
to work on refugees’ integration in a comprehensive 
manner	has	proved	to	be	a	difficult	task.	First,	because	
integration policies are mainly considered to be the 
primary competence of member states. Second, because 
refugee integration was, in the midst of the so-called 
refugee crisis, the last of EU leaders’ priorities. Instead, 
EU	leaders	not	only	had	to	deal	with	the	large	influx	of	
migrants arriving on European shores, but also with the 
unprecedented	tensions	the	influx	brought	about	in	and	
among member states. What followed was an intense 
discussion on how the EU should manage its external 
borders and ensure a fair ‘distribution’ of refugees across 
EU countries. In this context, the external dimension 
of the so-called refugee crisis effectively pushed the 
integration question to the background. 
Even though the burning question of border management 
has still not been resolved, this paper aims to approach 
the question of migration from another perspective. It 
further builds on the well-documented evidence that 
European societies and economies will require immigrants’ 
contributions.	First,	the	old	age	dependency	ratio,	i.e.	the	
ratio between the number of people aged 65 and above 
4and the number of working age persons (15-64 years) 
will exceed 50% by 2050, up from 28.8% in 2015. Given 
the solidarity mechanisms that govern European welfare 
models	and	pension	systems,	the	financial	costs	related	to	
this demographic shift will be impossible to bear without 
immigration. An expected labour shortage constitutes 
the	second	argument.	The	significant	scale	of	unfilled	
vacancies is becoming a real issue. This is particularly the 
case in low- and medium-skill sectors3 and in Central and 
Eastern European countries.4 Several member states, most 
notably Germany, have responded by attracting foreign 
workers, as well as supporting the economic activation 
and empowerment of refugees and other migrants of 
those already within the EU. This strategy will become 
increasingly necessary for European states.
Based on this evidence, the authors of this discussion 
paper explore how to maximise the EU’s added value 
in refugee integration, while arguing that targeted EU 
actions	would	have	the	double	benefit	of	making	EU	
migration policies more sustainable in the long run and, 
at the same time, offering a counter-narrative to anti-
migration forces. The analysis and recommendations put 
forward in this paper are the result of an EPC project on 
how the EU can boost the employment rate of refugees 
and facilitate the role of employers in that respect. 
This	paper	is	structured	as	follows:	it	first	outlines	the	
challenge of refugee integration and the scope of current 
EU responses. Section 2 highlights the limitations 
of past efforts and the resulting obstacles faced by 
employers	and	local	actors.	Finally,	section	3	presents	
recommendations to capitalise on the EU’s added value 
and improve prospects for refugees on the ground, while 
taking the Union’s current political context and policy 
environment into account.
1.  The European context of refugee  
integration policies
Access to the labour market is a crucial element of 
integration. As well as being a source of income, 
jobs serve as a vehicle for social inclusion. Through 
employment, refugees learn new skills, acquire a 
command of the local language, develop relationships, 
and build up their self-esteem. That is why employers 
are pivotal in the integration process: they can help 
bridge the gap between the initial reception of refugees 
and their sustainable and long-term inclusion into the 
host society.
Employers are pivotal in the integration 
process: they can help bridge the  
gap between the initial reception  
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1.1   THE SCOPE OF THE CHALLENGE ACROSS 
EUROPE
Among the newly arrived migrants, asylum seekers 
and refugees are faced with a particular employment 
disadvantage. In addition to the challenges that all 
newcomers to the labour market have to deal with, 
they	are	burdened	by	difficulties	linked	to	their	legal	
status or their motivations for migrating. These 
complications can include interrupted employment or 
education trajectories, psychological trauma resulting 
from long and dangerous journeys, and lengthy status 
determination processes.
As a result, the employment rate of refugees is far below 
the average. In 2014, the employment rate of refugees 
hovered	at	27%	in	the	first	five	years	after	arrival,	compared	
to 65% for the native-born population.5 The rate is 
expected to be even lower for more recent arrivals, due to 
the renewed pressure on asylum and integration systems 
in recent years. In the Netherlands, for example, 4% of 
adults who had received a refugee status in 2014 were in 
employment one and a half year later, rising to 11% after 
two and a half years.6	Many	refugees	are	also	over-qualified	
for their job and suffer discrimination in terms of wages, 
employment protection, and career prospects.
The employment rate of refugees also varies widely 
across member states, ranging from 40.6% in Spain to 
61.3% in Italy (these rates represent all individuals who 
arrived having a refugee status, including those who 
have been in the host country for prolonged periods of 
time).7	Integration	levels	also	differ	between	groups.	For	
instance, the employment rate of refugee women is 17% 
lower than that of men.8 Tailor-made policies are required 
to	address	these	different	challenges	and	the	specific	
needs of the most vulnerable individuals. 
Designing the right policies is even more important 
as	evidence	shows	that	it	has	a	significant	impact	on	
citizens’ perceptions. In fact, the latest Eurobarometer 
on the issue reveals that people tend to support 
integration policies when they see integration 
as successful in their local area or country.9 The 
differentiated success of labour market integration 
across the EU also indicates that policies matter and 
that refugees’ relative low level of employment is not 
inevitable. In this respect, the EU has launched several 
initiatives over the past decade to improve refugee 
integration, comprising legislation, policy commitments, 
and	financial	support.	Before	we	assess	their	impact,	we	
5will have a closer look at how they were developed  
and implemented.
The differentiated success of labour market 
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1.2   THE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK
On the legislative side, several directives promote the 
integration	and	fair	treatment	of	refugees.	For	example,	
the Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU) requires 
member states to grant labour market access to refugees 
and asylum seekers within nine months of lodging an 
application	for	asylum.	The	Qualification	Directive	
(2011/95/EU)	guarantees	the	fair	treatment	of	refugees	
as well as support measures for their labour market 
integration. The Commission is currently revising both 
directives, as part of the broader reform of the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS), which seeks to 
harmonise standards between member states to reduce 
incentives for secondary movements.
Furthermore,	the	European	Commission	has	intensified	
its policy actions since 2015, not least in response to the 
increased pressure on the asylum system. In June 2016, the 
Commission presented its Action Plan on the Integration 
of	Third	Country	Nationals.	One	of	its	five	priorities	
addresses labour market integration (its other priorities 
are education, pre-arrival measures, social inclusion, and 
access	to	basic	services),	with	some	initiatives	specifically	
targeting refugees. The action plan foresees the training of 
the	staff	at	the	reception	centres	to	accelerate	qualification	
recognition procedures. Several other measures encourage 
mutual learning and the sharing of best practices, such 
as the creation of an online repository of good practices 
on refugee integration into the labour market, and the 
development of the European Integration Network aimed 
at promoting learning and cooperation opportunities 
across civil society and both national and EU authorities. 
Other	efforts	focus	on	early	skill	identification.	The	EU	
has	established	an	EU	Skills	Profile	Tool	for	third	country	
nationals	that	helps	migrants	get	a	first	assessment	 
of their skills, and supports national services in  
providing appropriate guidance on employment,  
training	and/or	further	education.	Furthermore,	the	
European	Qualifications	Framework	was	recently	revised	to	
help national services understand degrees  
and	qualifications	issued	in	third	countries.
Finally,	the	EU	provides	financial	support	to	the	labour	
market integration of refugees. The Asylum, Migration 
and	Integration	Fund	(AMIF)	is	the	most	relevant	
instrument.	20%	of	the	EUR	2.39	billion	that	the	EU	has	
granted as ‘basic allocations’10 to states for the period 
2014-2020 were earmarked for integration policies.11
2.  Assessing the impact of current policies
Despite a range of EU initiatives to support refugee 
integration, the following part explains why there has 
been a collective failure in the delivery of integration 
policies so far, which has a knock-on effect on the level 
of refugee labour market participation.
2.1   A COLLECTIVE FAILURE
The conclusions of the latest European summits have 
highlighted, once again, the high political sensitivity of 
migration issues, the political divisions on how to make 
the	CEAS	more	efficient,	and	the	inability	of	the	EU27	
to agree on or implement solidarity mechanisms that 
could guarantee a fairer distribution of responsibilities 
across member states. The lack of consensus reveals the 
discrepancy of views on migration in the member states. 
Some see migrants mainly as a burden rather than an 
opportunity, be it economic, social, or cultural.12 The 
absence of well-thought-out integration policies and 
the failure to deal successfully with diversity will only 
further strengthen this perception, making structural 
progress	on	the	reform	of	the	CEAS	even	more	difficult.	
The two policies are in reality closely intertwined. The 
successful integration of migrants could make the host 
country population more accepting of newcomers, 
allowing for a fairer distribution of refugees across 
member states and ensuring the overall sustainability of 
the asylum system. 
The successful integration of migrants 
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member states and ensuring the overall 
sustainability of the asylum system.
 
The relative failure of integration policies is also  
notable when one looks at immigrant labour market 
participation rates in the long run. The graph compares 
the employment rate of native-born citizens with  
that	of	first-	and	second-generation	immigrants.	 
On average in the EU, the employment rate of  
second-generation immigrants is 4.8 percentage  
points lower than that of natives, showing that there  
is a need for policy improvement. 
6Because the main competencies to act on integration 
policies lie with the member states, they should, of 
course, be held responsible for the results. However, 
there is also a number of factors that limit the possible 
positive	impact	of	EU	actions.	First,	data	collection	at	
both the national and EU level is limited. In addition, 
there has been no systemic evaluation of the effect  
of EU tools and programmes.13	For	instance,	the	 
Action Plan on Third Country Nationals is currently  
undergoing evaluation, but it is not expected  
to continue beyond 2018, excluding therefore  
possible improvements.14
Second,	the	bureaucracy	and	inflexibility	of	EU	funding	
deter relevant organisations from applying. The 
multilevel governance structure of integration support 
adds confusion since different funds are allocated to 
regional or national levels.15	Lastly,	while	AMIF	includes	a	
mandatory allocation of 20% of its budget for integration 
activities in the member states, it does not set a minimum 
for overall spending. As a result, several member states 
only spend what they consider to be necessary on 
integration programmes, while others such as Greece, 
Portugal, and Poland spend even less.16
Third, the newly created information-sharing  
networks	have	not	all	proved	to	be	sufficient.	They	
need	a	thorough	promotion	for	officials,	employers,	and	
asylum seekers to be aware of their existence. Besides, 
there is little indication that refugees are meaningfully 
involved or represented in these networks, which 
predominantly target senior civil servants.17 Relevant 
experiences and personal needs could therefore be  
side-lined when drafting integration programmes.  
The large number of new initiatives may also  
prove counterproductive. It increases the risk of 
duplicating efforts and withheld information in 
competing networks.
Lastly, integration practices and spending still vary  
widely across countries due to a lack of legislative 
enforcement.18	For	instance,	the	timeframe	for	granting	
refugees and asylum seekers access to labour markets 
still differs considerably, despite EU efforts to harmonise 
it at nine months. Whereas Sweden grants the access 
early on, immediately after an asylum application is 
lodged,	France	and	the	UK	delay	it	up	to	nine	and	twelve	
months respectively.19
2.2   MAIN OBSTACLES FACED BY EMPLOYERS
The responses to a questionnaire sent to European 
employers in the context of the EPC project indicate 
that they face common challenges when trying to hire 
refugees.20 A lack of knowledge surrounding refugees’ 
right to work, uncertainty resulting from the length of 
their residence permit, and a real or perceived inability 
to cater to refugees’ needs are important reasons why 
employers struggle to hire them. Besides, the results of 
the EPC questionnaire indicate that three obstacles are 
particularly problematic for employers:
q the	lengthy	and	cumbersome	process	of	qualification	
recognition;
q the	insufficient	number	of	language	and	job-specific	
training opportunities; and
q the lack of coordination with public authorities.
Recognition procedures
Many refugees have acquired competencies and skills in 
their home countries. Upon arrival in the host country, 
they seek to continue their studies or join the labour 
market. However, the lack of effective recognition 
Native-born with native background
Native-born  with mixed background and forein background (second generation immigrants)
Foreign-born (first generation immigrants)
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7procedures prevents them from putting their previously 
acquired skills to use. The existence of various 
recognition paths and the lack of clarity about who is 
responsible for delivering them adds complexity to the 
process. There are also no systems in place that allow for 
the	recognition	of	qualifications	without	documented	
evidence or for the validation of refugees’ non-formal 
learning, such as the acquired in the workplace. 
Three obstacles are particularly 
problematic for employers: the lengthy 
and cumbersome process of qualification 
recognition; the insufficient number 
of language and job-specific training 
opportunities; the lack of coordination 
with public authorities.
 
In addition, employers might be bound by legal hiring 
requirements concerning technical skills, references, 
or security background checks, which makes the 
recruitment of refugees who cannot provide the necessary 
documented	evidence	of	their	qualifications	very	difficult.	
Some countries (e.g. Germany, Denmark, and Norway) 
have established fast-tracked and systematic procedures 
for skills assessment, but they are the exception, not the 
rule in the EU. In Spain, for example, the recognition 
process	for	formal	qualifications	can	take	up	to	two	or	
four years and requires a fee (EUR 160) on top of the 
translation and mailing costs.21
Language skills
Access to training opportunities, especially language 
courses, is crucial for the successful integration of 
refugees.	Research	shows	that	the	level	of	proficiency	
in the local language has a direct positive impact on 
refugees’ employment prospects.22 It is even more 
relevant in the current economic context where 
manufacturing jobs tend to disappear and most 
employment growth is in the service sector, for which 
language skills are essential. Some refugees may have 
never worked before and need more support to secure 
employment. Legal restrictions on working and a lack of 
training opportunities during the lengthy asylum process 
are important contributing factors to refugees taking 
longer than other third country nationals to integrate 
into the labour market. 
Uncoordinated support
Finally,	many	employers	believe	that	they	receive	
inadequate support from local, regional, or national 
authorities when hiring refugees. They often underline 
the lack of coordination in the provision of support 
measures. Multiple public and private actors take 
initiatives and intervene at the local, regional, and 
national levels without a coherent strategy or exchange of 
information.	As	a	result,	it	can	be	difficult	to	find	correct	
and up-to-date information, particularly for small and 
medium-sized enterprises, which have more limited 
resources than multinational corporations and rely even 
more	on	external	support.	For	example,	a	lot	of	employers	
that responded to our questionnaire reported having 
to turn to a variety of different organisations for help, 
including	NGOs,	employment	agencies,	private	firms,	
ministries, and international organisations.
3.   Making the most of the European Union’s  
added value
Academic researchers, civil society organisations, and 
some	member	states	have	identified	various	good	practice	
examples of the successful labour market integration of 
refugees. They include the need for early intervention,23 
personalised integration programmes,24 addressing 
physical and mental health issues,25 matching refugees’ 
talent to employers’ needs,26 and strengthening the 
employers’ awareness of refugees’ legal status.27 Many  
of these recommendations – most of which concern 
national or regional authorities – have already been 
discussed at length.
In this discussion paper, the authors instead focus on 
how to maximise the impact of EU action on the three 
critical	obstacles	mentioned	above	(i.e.	qualification	
recognition, training opportunities, and coordination of 
support measures). Rather than tackling each obstacle to 
integration in an isolated way, this section explains how to 
make the most of the European Union’s added value. Our 
main argument is that the EU is able to create an enabling 
environment for local and regional authorities to develop 
integration policies that are better suited to address the 
obstacles mentioned above.
3.1 ADDRESSING FRAGMENTATION
Many local initiatives, mostly led by social entrepreneurs, 
have emerged during the so-called refugee crisis to 
improve refugee integration. There are mentorship 
programmes, entrepreneurship trainings or upskilling, 
and networking programmes that connect refugees with 
employers.	Locally,	they	have	had	a	significant	impact	and	
helped refugees enormously.28
So there is no shortage of good ideas and initiatives, 
but their reach and visibility must be scaled up.  In fact, 
much of this social innovation happens in a fragmented 
8way and lacks sustainable funding. Overall, their  
large number and limited size makes identifying, 
supporting and scaling up successful pilot projects 
rather challenging. In that respect, increasing EU 
financial	support	to	unlock	the	full	potential	of	social	
innovation and make it more sustainable in the  
long run is vital (see later section on ‘Leveraging EU 
financial	support’).
Furthermore,	the	impact	of	certain	EU	instruments	
remains limited when it comes to providing refugees  
with	a	first	work	experience	in	the	European	labour	
market.	The	EU	Skills	Profile	Tool	for	Third	Country	
Nationals, which offers guidance to organisations 
aiming to help third country nationals map their skills, 
qualifications	and	work	experience,	is	a	case	in	point:		
it	is	not	considered	to	be	an	official	skill	recognition	
and authentication tool. Despite the usefulness of the 
instrument to give refugees options regarding their 
future personal education and training path, it fails to 
simplify	the	process	of	qualification	recognition,	which	
remains a discretionary power of the member states. 
In	fact,	cross-country	recognition	is	often	defined	in	
bilateral agreements with third countries. In other words, 
each member state has a different list of third countries, 
and the scope of the bilateral agreements varies widely 
depending on various factors, including the shared 
‘migration history’ between the two countries.
The creation of standardised EU tools  
that would be valid in multiple member 
states would lead to tremendous  
efficiency gains.
 
Recommendations for EU actions
Going beyond the limited EU competencies in this area 
while maximising the EU’s added value is, however, 
possible. To do so, the EU should encourage and 
facilitate closer cooperation between member states  
on	qualification	recognition	(on	a	voluntary	basis).	 
The creation of standardised EU tools that would 
be valid in multiple member states would lead to 
tremendous	efficiency	gains.	Given	that	refugees	 
might move to another EU country once they obtain 
long-term resident status, the EU should deliver a 
certificate	recognising	their	qualifications,	which	 
would be valid in any country that is willing to use  
it.29 It would help save time and money as refugees, 
employers, and public authorities would not have 
to start the recognition process from scratch. This 
certificate	could	also	be	made	available	on	a	digital	
platform, accessible to all employment agencies  
with translation options. The digital platform  
would allow refugees to further increase their mobility 
across Europe while optimising the distribution of  
skills according to demand, and provide member  
states that are less advanced in this area with an  
easy-to-use tool.
3.2 OFFER POLICY GUIDANCE
The implementation of integration programmes comes 
with a set of complex policy trade-offs. Unfortunately, 
policymakers are often guided by short-term interests and 
immediate political considerations rather than the long-
term	benefits.	This,	in	turn,	can	lead	to	even	less	effective	
and more burdensome integration procedures. Two of 
these trade-offs are explained below. 
The implementation of integration 
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long-term benefits.
 
Trade-off 1: Investing in all asylum seekers vs a limited 
number of refugees 
Member states are faced with a dilemma: either invest 
in all asylum seekers as early as possible to maximise 
their chances of integration once they receive refugee 
status, but thereby run the risk of spending much-needed 
integration funds on individuals who will have no use 
for it, or invest solely in those documented refugees 
that have a secure status and are sure to stay in the 
host country for a longer period of time. Usually, only 
individuals with a refugee status can access the labour 
market and training courses. The main issue is that 
asylum procedures can be extremely lengthy and last up 
to 21 months.30 This means that asylum seekers cannot 
start looking for work while they wait for their refugee 
application to be processed. This delays their effective 
integration into the labour market.
Trade-off 2: Promoting swift labour market integration vs 
further education
The second trade-off is the speed with which to get 
refugees into employment. If swiftness is prioritised, the 
pressure on support systems can be reduced. However, 
this does not necessarily offer the best pathway to 
sustainable self-reliance and professional development. 
As with other segments of the population, entering 
employment too soon can trap refugees in low-skilled 
and low-wage jobs. It is likely to push refugees into 
underemployment or casual employment, which  
would not, in the long run, decrease their dependency  
on state support.
One way to deal with these trade-offs is to encourage 
and support language and skill training, and sometimes 
additional education in the early stages of integration, 
even if it delays the entry into the labour market. An 
alternative solution, which could mitigate the impact 
on national budgets, is to promote on-the-job training 
9or part-time work that allows migrants to seek an 
education simultaneously.
Entering employment too soon can trap 
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their dependency on state support.
 
Recommendations for EU actions
The EU has several tools at its disposal to address these 
policy dilemmas, guide national policies, and incentivise 
early investment: 
First,	the	EU	can	initiate	a	paradigm	shift	in	how	
integration policies are assessed, not least by introducing 
qualitative criteria in the evaluation of EU-funded 
projects. Such indicators could tell, for instance, whether 
a refugee has a job corresponding with his or her level 
of	qualification	and	experience.	Such	practices	would	
apply to each citizen and not only to refugees, to avoid 
stigmatisation. It is also of the utmost importance 
that	the	Regulation	on	the	European	Social	Fund	Plus	
(ESF+)	asks	member	states	to	use	qualitative	indicators	
to monitor refugee labour market integration and 
the sustainability of their labour market policies. 
Furthermore,	the	EU	should	consider	adding	indicators	
on refugees to the evaluation of other programmes 
co-financed	by	the	EU,	such	as	the	Youth	Guarantee,	
Erasmus+	or	ESF-funded	projects.	To	date,	it	is	unclear	
how these EU funds target refugees.
The EU can initiate a paradigm shift in 
how integration policies are assessed, not 
least by introducing qualitative criteria in 
the evaluation of EU-funded projects.
 
Second, the EU should incentivise investments in  
asylum seekers and refugees in the context of the 
ongoing CEAS reform. Negotiations suggest that 
the recast Reception Conditions Directive will grant 
migrants access to language courses as soon as they 
submit their asylum application – and to the labour 
market within six months.31 While reducing the 
maximum delay for accessing the labour market is 
positive, most member states already permit it within  
six months, so there is still room for more ambitious 
reform. In addition, the principle of early investment 
should	be	extended	to	job-specific	training	
opportunities. It is also important to ensure that  
such	training	is	financially	attainable.	
Third,	the	transformation	of	the	Qualification	Directive	
into a Regulation must not become a missed opportunity 
for reform. Despite calls to increase the minimum 
length of the initial residence permits granted to the 
beneficiaries	of	subsidiary	protection	and	refugees,	
negotiations suggest that they will remain at one and 
three years respectively, with a mandatory review of their 
status upon renewal.32 The legal uncertainty that such 
a cut-off threshold creates may lead employers to be 
discouraged from investing in the training and hiring of 
refugees, thereby rendering all other integration efforts 
less	effective.	A	five-year	initial,	renewable	residence	
permit	for	both	refugees	and	beneficiaries	of	subsidiary	
protection, with support for prolonging their residence 
if	they	find	employment	or	training,	could	significantly	
increase the effectiveness of integration policies. 
Fourth,	the	EU	should	monitor	how	member	states	
implement anti-discrimination legislation concerning 
refugees’ access to education, training, and employment 
programmes. More information on the legal instruments 
available	to	fight	discrimination	should	be	disseminated	
to social services, trade unions, and refugees themselves. 
Specific	EU	funding	should	support	trade	unions	across	
the EU to work in that direction.
The EU should monitor how member  
states implement anti-discrimination 
legislation concerning refugees’  
access to education, training, and 
employment programmes.
 
3.3  LEVERAGING THE EU’S FINANCIAL 
SUPPORT
The European Commission’s proposal on the 
Multiannual	Financial	Framework	(MFF)	for	the	2021-
2027 period provides a good opportunity to rethink 
how	EU	financial	instruments	can	foster	long-term	
integration and the social inclusion of refugees. The 
proposal integrates the long-term integration priority 
under	the	ESF+,	whereas	the	new	Asylum	and	Migration	
Fund	(AMF,	previously	AMIF)	will	focus	primarily	on	
immediate asylum needs and the external dimension of 
migration. These two funds would have budgets of  
EUR 101.2 billion and EUR 10.4 billion, respectively, at 
their disposal.
Recommendations for EU actions
Including	integration	policies	in	the	ESF+	would	have	
numerous	benefits.	It	would	help	promote	a	holistic	
approach towards integration, whereby employment 
would be supported alongside other essential integration 
policies, such as education, housing, or social services. 
Moreover, it would further reduce silo-policymaking and 
avoid unnecessary competition for funding between two 
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equally important objectives, i.e. the immediate needs 
of	migrants	and	the	more	long-term	difficulties	refugees	
face in host countries. However, policymakers should be 
careful about the possible risk of policy fragmentation. 
When organisations seek to offer continuous support 
throughout someone’s integration journey, they will now 
need to apply to two different funds and instruments. It 
might increase the probability of discontinuity and lead 
to gaps in integration support and overlapping efforts.  
In response, policymakers at EU and national level  
should monitor this risk, and develop strong systems of 
dialogue and coordination between the managements  
of both funds. 
Policymakers at EU and national level 
should monitor this risk, and develop strong 
systems of dialogue and coordination 
between the managements of both funds.
 
Concerning the amount of funding, it is encouraging 
to	see	that	the	EU	will	earmark	at	least	25%	of	ESF+	
resources under shared management to socio-economic 
integration.	However,	there	is	no	specific	target	for	how	
much should go to third country nationals and refugees 
in particular. As a result, national authorities may 
continue to concentrate the funding on other segments 
of the population, especially if refugee integration is 
not a priority shared by local and regional policymakers. 
That is why, together with the introduction of 
appropriate indicators concerning refugees mentioned 
earlier in this paper, EU-funded programmes must 
establish	specific	allocation	targets	for	refugees	and	
asylum seekers.
Finally,	other	instruments	of	the	MFF,	such	as	InvestEU,	
could also support the integration of refugees and provide 
funding to projects where the return on investment is 
less immediate and tangible than the ones usually backed 
by commercial banks. Introducing the concept of social 
investment into integration policies and practices is 
essential to guarantee their sustainability and positive 
impact in the long run.
Other instruments of the MFF, such as 
InvestEU, could also support the integration 
of refugees and provide funding to projects 
where the return on investment is less 
immediate and tangible than the ones 
usually backed by commercial banks.
 
The Commission has announced its intention to earmark 
a share of InvestEU to social investment and skills. It must 
now put forward a robust methodology to identify social 
investment needs across the EU (while not overlooking 
those of refugees) and measure the medium to long-term 
benefits	of	current	integration	policies.	Such	an	approach	
would help build evidence of the return on investment 
of integration policies, which is needed to convince the 
most	sceptical	voices.	Furthermore,	a	high	concentration	
of refugees and asylum seekers, such as on the Italian 
and Greek shores, needs to become a primary allocation 
criteria of InvestEU. With that as a guiding principle, the 
EU budget would demonstrate that the EU can provide 
concrete solutions to the migration crisis and give tangible 
support to local authorities affected by it.
4. Conclusion
There is no sign of political appeasement on EU 
migration policies in the near future. Divisions in the 
European Council have grown wider in the past few 
months, leaving several vital proposals, such as the 
Dublin Regulation recast, at a standstill. EU actions in 
this	field	have	been	particularly	challenging	as	anti-
migration forces have recently entered several national 
governments. The situation is likely to get worse 
after	the	European	elections	in	May	2019,	which	are	
expected to result in a surge of right-wing populists 
in the Parliament. Illiberal voices could join forces to 
further politicise and polarise the debate on migration 
and integration and oppose any joint actions at the 
European level. 
This paper has shown the links between the long-term 
sustainability of the CEAS and the success of integration 
policies.	Failure	in	one	of	the	two	areas	has	detrimental	
effects on the other and on how migration issues are 
perceived and debated at national level. Continuing 
to disentangle both aspects would, therefore, be a 
mistake. It would reinforce citizens’ support for national 
solutions and not only make future negotiations on the 
CEAS	even	more	difficult,	but	also	increase	the	risk	of	
the CEAS imploding. It is, therefore, essential for the EU 
to deliver on integration policies and show how it can 
provide suitable alternatives to national practices. 
However, the current distribution of competences on 
integration policies limits the EU’s room for manoeuver. 
Although the current political mood does not allow any 
questioning of where and how integration policies  
are designed best, the EU still has the possibility to 
enhance its added value in this area. The most viable 
option is to engage in a serious dialogue with European 
employers. In fact, designing policies that address  
their concerns, and enhancing their positive perception 
of	how	the	EU	can	help	in	this	field	is	crucial.	By	
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addressing the needs of employers, the EU would be 
in the position to become part of the solution, act as a 
legitimate interface between employers and national 
authorities and offer a credible counter-narrative to the 
anti-migration discourse. 
This paper has shown the links between 
the long-term sustainability of the CEAS 
and the success of integration policies.
 
In the end, delivering on refugee integration is more than 
a question of competences and protecting the future of 
the CEAS. It is, even if indirectly, about the future of our 
European societies, the performance of our economies 
and the ability of member states to address common 
challenges, which lies at the core of the European project’s 
raison d’être. With the current politico-institutional 
cycle coming to an end, it is the right time for the EU to 
ensure	that	ongoing	negotiations	on	the	financial	and	
policy	framework	that	will	shape	the	next	cycle	reflect	the	
recommendations presented in this paper.
By addressing the needs of employers,  
the EU would be in the position to  
become part of the solution, act as a 
legitimate interface between employers 
and national authorities and offer a 
credible counter-narrative to the  
anti-migration discourse.
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